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Abstract—The increasing complexity and interdepen-
dency of today’s networks highlight the importance of
studying network robustness to failure and attacks. Many
large-scale networks are prone to cascading effects where
a limited number of initial failures (due to attacks, nat-
ural hazards or resource depletion) propagate through
a dependent mechanism, ultimately leading to a global
failure scenario where a substantial fraction of the network
loses its functionality. These cascading failure scenarios
often take place in networks which are embedded in space
and constrained by geometry. Building on previous results
on cascading failure in random geometric networks, we
introduce and analyze a continuous cascading failure model
where a node has an initial continuously-valued state, and
fails if the aggregate state of its neighbors fall below a
threshold. Within this model, we derive analytical condi-
tions for the occurrence and non-occurrence of cascading
node failure, respectively.
Index Terms—Cascading Failure, Epidemics, Percola-
tion, Degree Dependent Failure, Random Geometric Net-
works
I. INTRODUCTION
Many large-scale networks are prone to cascading
effects where a limited number of initial node and/or
link failures (due to attacks, natural hazards or re-
source depletion) lead to further failures through a
dependent mechanism, ultimately leading to a global
failure scenario where a substantial fraction of the net-
work nodes and/or links lose their functionality. Such
cascading effects can be observed in electrical power
networks, communication networks, social networks, and
biological networks. In electrical power networks, the
failure of a few power lines carrying load can result
in redistribution of the load onto other lines, which
may fail due to excessive load, thus potentially leading
to a cascading power blackout [1]. In communication
networks, a similar phenomenon may occur as the failure
of a few communication nodes and/or links causes
traffic to be redirected to other links, causing additional
congestion, which may snowball into a global state of
“congestion collapse.” In social and economic networks,
initial adoption of opinions or decisions by a limited
number of individuals may spread to others through
social influencing mechanisms, resulting in widespread
adoption on a global scale [2]. Cascading effects can be
observed not only in single networks, but also in inter-
dependent networks where the failure of a small number
of nodes in just one network lead to failures in the other
network, and vice versa, resulting in a significant part
of the interdependent network becoming unavailable. A
classical example of this is the interdependence between
the power grid and the communication infrastructure,
where power failures can lead to communication failures,
which in turn, lead to cascading power failures [3].
Three salient features arise from the cascading failure
scenarios discussed above. First, the state of a node
or link typically depends on the states of multiple
neighbors. This is true not only in single networks but
also in interdependent networks, where for instance,
a node in the communication network may receive
power from several substations in the power network
and a power substation may be controlled by several
communication nodes. Second, in predicting the oc-
currence or non-occurrence of cascading failure, it is
often necessary to describe the functional state of a
node or link in more refined terms than simply binary.
For example, a communication node receiving power
from several power substations may fail only if the
aggregate power delivered by the power substations is
below a required threshold. Likewise, a power node
controlled by several communication nodes may fail
only if the aggregate communication bandwidth from
the communication nodes falls below a threshold. In
these cases, the state of a functioning node is more
usefully described by a continuously-valued parameter
(e.g. power supplied or bandwidth offered). Third, in
assessing cascades in networks spatial constraints are
often important considerations. Real networks such as
power grids, communication networks, and biological
networks are embedded in space, highlighting the role
of geometry. For instance, in wireless communication
networks, worms and viruses planted in mobile devices
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can infect geographically nearby mobile devices, poten-
tially propagating a “wireless epidemic” in the manner
of biological epidemics [4]. The importance of geometry
extends to interdependent networks. In the scenario
observed in Italy in September 2003, where an iterative
cascade took place between power and communication
networks, every internet server in the communication
network is connected to the geographically closest power
station [3].
To address the key issues discussed above, we present
and analyze a new continuous model for cascading node
failure in large-scale networks. In this model, each node
has an initial state represented by a continuously-valued
parameter. This parameter reflects, for instance, the re-
source level (e.g. power or bandwidth) that the node can
provide to its neighboring nodes. We examine failure
scenarios which start with an initial node failure (result-
ing from attacks, natural hazards or resource depletion).
When a node fails, its state falls to zero. The dependent
mechanism by which failures propagate in the network
is described as follows. Each node has a continuously-
valued threshold which describes its requirement for
resources from its neighboring nodes. A node fails if
and only if it has at least one failed neighbor and the
sum of the states of its neighboring nodes falls below
its threshold. Such a failure mechanism is applicable
to both single networks and interdependent networks.
In this paper, we focus on cascading failure scenarios
under the given mechanism in the context of single
networks. To reflect important spatial constraints, we
shall examine cascading node failure within the context
of random geometric graphs (RGG), in which nodes are
spatially distributed according to Poisson point process
of a given density and two nodes share a link if their
distance is below a given distance parameter. We will
develop analytical conditions for the occurrence or non-
occurrence of cascading failure under the continuous
failure model for random geometric networks.
Cascading failure in random geometric networks was
first studied in [5], where every node has binary state
(either functional or failed) and fails if the fraction of
its neighboring nodes which have failed exceeds a given
threshold. A degree-dependent percolation model is used
to find analytical conditions for the occurrence of non-
occurrence of cascading node failure [5]. Cascading link
failure in random geometric networks is analyzed in [6],
which uses a mapping from links in a RGG to nodes in
corresponding dual covering graph to derive analytical
results on degree-dependent and cascading link failure.
The continuous cascading failure model presented in this
paper can be seen as a generalization of the degree-
dependent models presented in [5], [6]. Note that while
we focus on cascading node failures in this paper, the
results may be applied to cascading link failure scenarios
using the techniques of [6].
Cascading failure in networks where nodes have
continuously-valued state have been studied in [1], [7]. In
these papers, the state of a node is defined as the load it
carries. When a node failed, its load is added to the loads
of other nodes. For instance, in [7], loads are transmitted
between pairs of nodes through the shortest path between
them. When a node fails along with its adjacent links,
shortest paths must change and the load on the new
shortest paths increase. When the load on a node on
the new shortest paths exceeds a given capacity, the node
fails and this failure may propagate, leading to cascading
failure in the network. The continuous cascading failure
model presented in this paper considers a different mech-
anism from those in [1], [7]. Furthermore, we consider
practical spatial constraints through modeling of random
geometric graphs.
We present the continuous failure model in Section II,
identify the special role played by “highly vulnerable”
and “highly reliable” nodes, and derive analytical condi-
tions for the occurrence and non-occurrence of cascading
node failure (respectively) in RGGs under the continuous
failure model. We then evaluate the conclusions of the
analysis via numerical simulations in Section III.
II. NETWORK AND CONTINUOUS FAILURE MODEL
A. Network Model
Consider a large-scale network modeled by an (in-
finite) RGG G(Hλ, r), where the vertex set Hλ is a
homogeneous Poisson point process in R2 with density
λ > 0, and two nodes Xi, Xj ∈ Hλ share an undirected
link if and only if ||Xi − Xj || ≤ r (r > 0), with
||Xi − Xj || being the Euclidean distance between Xi
and Xj . Since RGGs have the scaling property [8], [9],
we focus on G(Hλ, 1) in the following.
Let Hλ,0 = Hλ ∪ {0} be the union of the origin
and Hλ. It is well known from the study of continuum
percolation that there exists a critical density λc, 0 <
λc <∞, such that for λ < λc, the component containing
the origin in the graph G(Hλ,0, 1) has a finite number of
nodes almost surely, while for λ > λc, the component
containing the origin has an infinite number of nodes
with positive probability. Furthermore it is known that
if λ > λc, there exists a unique infinite component in
G(Hλ, 1) [8]–[11].
For analytical convenience, we consider RGG in the
infinite graph setting. One can analogously define a finite
RGG G(Xn, 1) with n nodes. It can be shown that if
λ > λc, there exists a unique largest component of size
Θ(n) in G(Xn, 1), called the giant component (GC). If
λ < λc, the largest component in G(Xn, 1) can have
only size O(log n) [9].
B. Continuous Failure Model
We now investigate the cascading failure phenomenon
in random geometric networks under a continuous failure
model. Assume all nodes in G(Hλ, 1), where λ > λc,
are initially functional. Now consider an initial failure
seed represented by a single failed node. The question
is whether this initial failure can lead, via the dependent
failure mechanism to be discussed below, to a global
cascade of failures in G(Hλ, 1). As discussed in [5], a
cascading failure can be characterized by establishing
whether the network has been affected in a global
manner rather than in an isolated local manner. This is
a notion which can be appropriately captured using the
concept of percolation.
Definition 1. [5] A cascading failure is an ordered
sequence of node failures triggered by an initial failure,
resulting in an infinite component of failed nodes in the
network.
For each node j ∈ Hλ, associate a continuously-
valued state Sj ∈ [0, 1] representing, for instance, the
resource level that node j can provide to its neighboring
nodes. Also associate with each node j a continuously-
valued threshold φj ∈ [0,∞) representing the resource
level required by node j to stay functional. We shall as-
sume that the initial node states S′j (before any failures)
are i.i.d. random variables taking values in (0, 1] with
probability density function fS′ and that the φj’s are
i.i.d. random variables with probability density fφ. Fur-
thermore, assume that {S′j} and and {φj} are mutually
independent.
Node Failure Model: If node j has at least one failed
neighbor, and
∑
k∈Kj Sk < φj , where Kj is the set of
neighbors of j, then node j fails. The state of node j is
zero (Sj = 0) if and only if j is a failed node. Otherwise,
node j is said to be functional.
C. Analysis of Cascading Failure
In [5], it is shown that the set of vulnerable nodes and
the set of reliable nodes play key roles in determining the
occurrence or non-occurrence of cascading node failure
in RGGs with a binary degree-dependent failure model.
In the context of [5], a vulnerable node is a node which
fails if just one of its neighbors fails. A reliable node is
a node which does not fail unless all its neighbors fail.
An unreliable node is a node which is not reliable.
It turns out that similar notions are key for determining
the occurrence or non-occurrence of cascading node fail-
ure within the proposed continuous-state failure model.
Definition 2. A highly vulnerable node is a node whose
threshold satisfies
φ > k −min
i∈K
{S′i},
where K is the set of the neighbors of the node, and
k = |K|.
Definition 3. A highly reliable node is a node whose
threshold satisfies
φ ≤ min
i∈K
{S′i}.
A node which is not highly reliable is said to be a weak
node.
From the above definitions, it is clear that a highly
vulnerable node fails if any one of its neighbors fails.
Thus, the set of highly vulnerable nodes is a subset of
the vulnerable nodes. 1 Similarly, a highly reliable node
remains functional as long as one of its neighbors is
functional. Thus, the set of highly reliable nodes is a
subset of the reliable nodes.
Lemma 1. The probability of a node being highly
vulnerable is
ρk =
[
1−
∫ k
0
FS′(k − ϕ)fφ(ϕ)dϕ
]k
,
where k is the number of neighbors of the node, FS′ is
the distribution function of the initial state S′, and fφ is
the probability density function of the threshold φ. The
probability of a node being highly reliable is
σk =
[
1−
∫ ∞
0
FS′(ϕ)fφ(ϕ)dϕ
]k
.
Proof: We have
ρk = Pr{φ > k −min
i∈K
{S′i}} = Pr{min
i∈K
{S′i} > k − φ}
(a)
= Pr{S′ > k − φ}k
(b)
=
[ ∫ ∞
0
Pr{S′ > k − φ|φ = ϕ}fφ(ϕ)dϕ
]k
=
[ ∫ ∞
0
(1− Pr{S′ ≤ k − ϕ})fφ(ϕ)dϕ
]k
=
[ ∫ ∞
0
fφ(ϕ)dϕ−
∫ ∞
0
FS′(k − ϕ)fφ(ϕ)dϕ
]k
=
[
1−
∫ ∞
0
FS′(k − ϕ)fφ(ϕ)dϕ
]k
1Note that φ > k− 1 is also sufficient for a node to be vulnerable.
Indeed, this may seem to be a tighter condition than the condition
given in Definition 2. It turns out, however, that φ > k − 1 does not
lead to a useful sufficient condition for a GC of vulnerable nodes. One
reason is that the condition does not involve the distribution of S′.
=[
1−
∫ k
0
FS′(k − ϕ)fφ(ϕ)dϕ
]k
Here, (a) is due to the mutual independence of the S′i’s
and (b) is due to the mutual independence of the S′i’s
and φi’s. Next, we have
σk = Pr{φ ≤ min
i∈K
{S′i}} = Pr{S′ ≥ φ}k
=
[ ∫ ∞
0
Pr{S′ ≥ φ|φ = ϕ}fφ(ϕ)dϕ
]k
=
[ ∫ ∞
0
(1− Pr{S′ < ϕ})fφ(ϕ)dϕ
]k
=
[ ∫ ∞
0
fφ(ϕ)dϕ−
∫ ∞
0
FS′(ϕ)fφ(ϕ)dϕ
]k
=
[
1−
∫ ∞
0
FS′(ϕ)fφ(ϕ)dϕ
]k
.
Note that the probabilities ρk and σk depend only on
the degree k and the distributions of S′ and φ.
We will now use the concepts of highly vulnerable
and highly reliable nodes to derive a sufficient condition
for the occurrence of cascading node failure and a
sufficient condition for the non-occurrence of cascading
node failure, respectively.
Theorem 1. For any λ1 > λc and G(Hλ, 1) with λ >
λ1, there exists k0 < ∞ depending on λ and λ1 such
that if [
1−
∫ k
0
FS′(k − ϕ)fφ(ϕ)dϕ
]k
≥ λ1
λ
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ k0, then with probability 1, there
exists an infinite component of highly vulnerable nodes
in G(Hλ, 1). Moreover, if the initial failure is inside this
component or adjacent to some node in this component,
then with probability 1, there is cascading node failure
in G(Hλ, 1).
Proof: We view the problem as a degree-dependent
node failure problem where a highly vulnerable node
is considered “operational” and all other nodes are
considered “failed”. In this model, a node with degree k
fails with probability 1−ρk where ρk is given by Lemma
1. Then, by applying Theorem 1-(i) from [5], we obtain
the sufficient condition for having an infinite component
of highly vulnerable nodes in G(Hλ, 1). Furthermore,
since highly vulnerable nodes are also vulnerable, it is
clear that if the initial failure is inside this component
or adjacent to some node in this component, then there
is cascading node failure in G(Hλ, 1).
Theorem 2. For any G(Hλ, 1) with λ > λc, if
∞∑
k=0
(λ
2
)k
k!
e−(
λ
2
)
( ∞∑
m=0
[λ(2
√
2 + pi)]m
m!
e−λ(2
√
2+pi)
×
(
1−
[
1−
∫ ∞
0
Fs′(ϕ)fφ(ϕ)dϕ
](m+k−1)k))
<
1
27
(1)
Then with probability 1, there is no infinite component of
weak nodes. As a consequence, with probability 1, there
is no cascading failure in G(Hλ, 1) no matter where the
initial failure is.
Proof: We view the problem as a degree-dependent
node failure problem where weak nodes are considered
“operational” and highly reliable nodes are “failed.” In
this model, a node with degree k fails with probability
σk where σk is given by Lemma 1. Note that σk is non-
increasing in k. Then, by Theorem 1-(ii) of [5], when (1)
holds, with probability 1, there is no infinite component
of weak nodes. Since the set of highly reliable nodes
is a subset of the reliable nodes, the set of weak nodes
is a superset of the unreliable nodes. Thus, when (1)
holds, with probability 1, there is no infinite component
of unreliable nodes. By Theorem 2(ii) of [5], this implies
that there is no cascading failure in G(Hλ, 1) no matter
where the initial failure is.
We now analytically evaluate the above conditions for
the occurrence and non-occurrence of cascading failure
within the context of an illustrative example.
Example 1. Consider G(Hλ, 1) with λ > λc. Assume
the initial node states {Sj} are i.i.d. uniform ran-
dom variables on (0, 1]. Furthermore, assume the node
thresholds {φj} are i.i.d. exponential random variables
with parameter µ > 0 (mutually independent of the
Sj’s).
We first use Theorem 1 to find a sufficient condition
for cascading failure for Example 1. Thus, we seek the
existence of a k0 such that[
1−
∫ k
0
FS′(k − ϕ)fφ(ϕ)dϕ
]k
≥ λ1
λ
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ k0. Since k ≥ 1, we have[
1−
∫ k
0
FS′(k − ϕ)fφ(ϕ)dϕ
]k
=
[
1−
∫ k−1
0
FS′(k − ϕ)fφ(ϕ)dϕ
−
∫ k
k−1
FS′(k − ϕ)fφ(ϕ)dϕ
]k
=
[
1−
∫ ∞
0
µe−µϕdϕ−
∫ k
k−1
(k − ϕ)µe−µϕdϕ
]k
=(
eµ − 1
µ
)k
e−µk
2
.
This leads to the following simple and intuitive condi-
tion for having an infinite component of highly vulnera-
ble nodes within the setting of Example 1, which in turn
implies the existence of cascading failure if the initial
failure is inside this component or adjacent to some node
in this component.
Proposition 1. Within the setting of Example 1, if
µ < m′(λ1λ ), where m
′(λ1λ ) is the solution to the
equation ( 1−e
−x
x ) =
λ1
λ , then an infinite component of
highly vulnerable nodes exists in G(Hλ, 1).
Proof: Since ( 1−e
−x
x ) is monotonically decreasing
in x, if µ < m′(λ1λ ), we have
1−e−µ
µ >
λ1
λ . Thus,
( e
µ−1
µ )
ke−µk
2
> λ1λ for k = 1. Since (
eµ−1
µ )
ke−µk
2
is decreasing and continuous in k ≥ 1 for µ > 0, there
exists k0 ≥ 1 such that ( eµ−1µ )ke−µk
2 ≥ λ1λ for all
1 ≤ k ≤ k0. Thus, µ < m′(λ1λ ) is a sufficient condition
for having an infinite component of highly vulnerable
nodes.
Note that the result of Proposition 1 is intuitively
reasonable. When µ is sufficiently small, the probability
of a node having a high threshold is large, and therefore
cascading failure becomes likely.
Next, we use Theorem 2 to find a sufficient condition
for not having an infinite component of weak nodes, and
therefore not having cascading failure, in the setting of
Example 1. For this, we fix the density to be λ = 4.2
The sufficient condition reduces to
∞∑
k=0
( 4
2
)k
k!
e−(
4
2
)
( ∞∑
m=0
[4(2
√
2 + pi)]m
m!
e−4(2
√
2+pi)
×
(
1−
[
1−
∫ ∞
0
FS′(ϕ)fφ(ϕ)dϕ
](m+k−1)k ))
=
∞∑
k=0
( 4
2
)k
k!
e−(
4
2
)
( ∞∑
m=0
[4(2
√
2 + pi)]m
m!
e−4(2
√
2+pi)
×
(
1−
[
1 +
e−µ − 1
µ
](m+k−1)k ))
<
1
27
. (2)
Since 1−(1+ e−µ−1µ )(m+k−1)k is decreasing in µ, the
LHS of (1) is decreasing in µ. The LHS of (2) is smaller
than 127 for µ ≥ 1357 (λ = 4). Thus for µ ≥ 1357, there
is no infinite component of weak nodes, and therefore
no cascading failure. Again, this result is intuitively
reasonable. When µ is sufficiently large, the probability
of a node having a high threshold is small, and therefore
2Note that the best known analytical upper bound on λc is 3.372.
cascading failure becomes unlikely. We will evaluate the
above conditions on µ through numerical simulation in
Section III.
III. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we experimentally evaluate Example 1.
The initial network is a finite RGG G(Xn, 1) with
density λ = 4 and n = 1600 nodes independently and
uniformly distributed in [0, 20]2. Initial node states are
i.i.d uniformly distributed on (0,1] and node thresholds
are i.i.d exponentially distributed with parameter µ.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the sufficient condition for the
existence of a GC of highly vulnerable nodes and thus
cascading node failure. We choose λc < λ1 = 3.85 < λ.
For these values, according to Proposition 1, µ < 0.076
is a sufficient condition for the existence of a GC of
highly vulnerable nodes. Figure 1 shows the presence
of GC of highly vulnerable nodes (represented by solid
nodes) when µ = 0.075. Figure 2 depicts the cascading
failure after the initial failure with µ = 0.075, where
empty nodes represent failed nodes and the location of
the initial failure is shown by an arrow.
Figure 3 and 4 illustrate the sufficient condition for
not having a GC of weak nodes. The condition for
Example 1 states that if µ > 1357, there is no GC of
weak nodes in the network. Figure 3 shows the same
network with µ = 1360 where empty nodes represent
the weak nodes and solid nodes represent highly reliable
nodes. Figure 4 shows the described network after the
initial failure where solid nodes are functional and empty
nodes are failed. As expected from a network with no
GC of weak nodes, there is no cascading failure.
IV. CONCLUSION
We introduced and analyzed a model for cascading
node failure in random geometric networks where nodes
have a continuously valued (rather than simply binary)
state. The concepts of highly vulnerable and highly
reliable nodes were introduced to obtain an analytical
necessary condition and an analytical sufficient condition
for the occurrence and non-occurrence of cascading
failure, respectively. These analytical conditions were
experimentally verified through numerical simulation.
Although we focused on a single geometric network, the
continuous model is also useful for analyzing cascad-
ing failure in interdependent geometric networks where
nodes in one network provide resources (e.g. power or
bandwidth) to nodes in the other network. The appli-
cation of this model to the interdependent case will be
treated in future work.
Fig. 1. µ = 0.075 ; GC of highly vulnerable nodes (solid)
Fig. 2. µ = 0.075 ; cascading failure ; initial failure indicated
by arrow; functional nodes are solid
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